Globalization, Industrialization and Labour Markets in China by Zhang, Miao et al.
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Articles and Chapters ILR Collection 
2015 
Globalization, Industrialization and Labour Markets in China 
Miao Zhang 
University of Malaya 
Rajah Rasiah 
University of Malaya 
Sarosh Kuruvilla 
Cornell University, sck4@cornell.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles 
 Part of the International and Comparative Labor Relations Commons, International Business 
Commons, International Economics Commons, and the Labor Economics Commons 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the ILR Collection at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Articles and Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more 
information, please contact catherwood-dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
Globalization, Industrialization and Labour Markets in China 
Abstract 
China’s experience with globalization is still contested. This paper seeks to examine the impact of global 
integration and industrialization on labour markets in China. The evidence shows that rising trade and 
flows of foreign direct investment has not only quickened industrialization and structural change but it 
has also stimulated a rapid rise in overall and manufacturing real wages. The government’s framework of 
absorbing marketization while maintaining planning control through decentralization has been critical in 
the development of technological capabilities in manufacturing. Although the nature of economic 
development after reforms has also widened regional inequalities with the Eastern coastal provinces 
enjoying higher growth and structural change than the Western and other inland provinces, rising wages 
suggest that the material conditions of the majority of workers in China have improved. 
Keywords 
globalization, industrialization, labour markets, China 
Disciplines 
International and Comparative Labor Relations | International Business | International Economics | Labor 
Economics 
Comments 
Required Publisher Statement 
© Taylor & Francis. Final version published as: Zhang, M., Rasiah, R., & Kuruvilla, S. (2015). Globalization, 
industrialization and labour markets in China. Journal of Asia Pacific Economy, 20(1), 2-13. DOI:10.1080/
13547860.2014.974313 
Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved. 
Suggested Citation 
Zhang, M., Rasiah, R., & Kuruvilla, S. (2015). Globalization, industrialization and labour markets in 
China[Electronic version]. Retrieved [insert date], from Cornell University, ILR School site: 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/1064 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/1064 
Globalization, industrialization and labour markets in China 
 
 
Miao Zhang 
University of Malaya, Malaysia 
Rajah Rasiah 
University of Malaya, Malaysia 
Sarosh Kuruvilla 
Cornell University 
 
China’s experience with globalization is still contested. This paper seeks to examine the impact of global 
integration and industrialization on labour markets in China. The evidence shows that rising trade and 
flows of foreign direct investment has not only quickened industrialization and structural change but it 
has also stimulated a rapid rise in overall and manufacturing real wages. The government’s framework 
of absorbing marketization while maintaining planning control through decentralization has been critical 
in the development of technological capabilities in manufacturing. Although the nature of economic 
development after reforms has also widened regional inequalities with the Eastern coastal provinces 
enjoying higher growth and structural change than the Western and other inland provinces, rising wages 
suggest that the material conditions of the majority of workers in China have improved. 
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1. Introduction 
 
When China announced its reform plans in 1978, few could have anticipated the miraculous growth that 
it will record, especially since 1992. Under the leadership of Mao, China had built the elements of 
nationalism for the central government to direct economic development, which helped a nationally 
united command economy to stimulate economic development through the unleashing of market 
forces, private dwellers and rapid integration into the global economy. Trade and investment flows 
brought China closer to the global economy. From specialization in light manufactured exports, China 
has undergone considerable structural change to participate in heavy and knowledge-intensive 
manufactured goods (Rasiah, Miao, and Xin, 2013). However, some economists have questioned 
China’s rapid growth by either claiming that official statistics are not reliable or that it has largely been 
propelled by agriculture, land use and labour-intensive industries (Young 2003).i Even more so China’s 
labour markets remain under-examined from the standpoint of whether rapid growth has been 
reflected in improvements to wages and working conditions. The latter is important to determine if 
China is following the high road to industrialization. 
 The historical precursor of industrialization in China can be traced to the Song 
Dynasty (960_1279) when steel was invented and produced and used extensively by the public. A series 
of pre-modern technological innovation and evolution of intellectual thought during the Song Dynasty 
made China one of the most prosperous and advanced economies in the medieval world.ii However, the 
weak succeeding regimes that followed did not carry this forward. In fact, large parts of China were 
colonized by the Western countries and Japan. After the establishment of People’s Republic of China 
(PRC), a real sense of industrialization did not happen until 1958 when the controversial campaign The 
Great Leap Forward was advanced by Mao Zedong. His aim to transform the newly born PRC from an 
agrarian economy to a modern communist society through state-led industrialization eventually failed. 
GDP per capita fell from 200 yuan in 1958 to 173 yuan in 1960. Thanks to reforms, industrialization 
resumed rapidly under the Deng Xiaoping Administration. 
 An assessment of globalization, industrialization and labour markets in China is important not 
only because of its rising importance as a major economic power but also because of its transformation 
from an agricultural economy to an industrial economy. The analysis will not only offer an opportunity 
to examine the contrasting passion scholars have on China. On the one hand, some accept the reality 
over the surge in industrialization and Chinese exports as an example of a successful development 
model in which the state has allowed market forces to operate within those social boundaries (e.g. 
Rasiah, Miao, and Xin, 2013). On the other hand, critics claim that Chinese data is fudged, and that the 
rapid growth is unsustainable owing to growing fuel deficits and environment disasters. 
 Hence, this paper seeks to examine the impact of globalization and industrialization on China’s 
labour market since reforms began. Specifically, the paper seeks to capture the impact of industrial 
structural change on the domestic labour market. Unlike neoliberal expositions of globalization, we will 
provide evidence to show that the complex nature of government policy in China was structured to 
allow both the provincialization, as well as, the localization of planning (Zhang and Rasiah 2014). Also, 
industrialization was promoted by the government taking account of the specific characteristics of the 
industries, the targets set for them, and provincial and municipal endowments. The rest of the paper is 
organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 examine globalization and industrialization in China with a focus 
on structural change. Section 4 analyses the demand supply model of labour market and discusses the 
impact of globalization and industrialization on it. Section 5 concludes with policy implications. 
 
2. Trade and investment flows 
 
While the globalization concept has a wide meaning that includes qualitative exchange of information 
and the forces shaping the process, for measurement purposes we confine the assessment to 
quantitative flows of trade and investment. Hence, we discuss trade and into the global capitalist 
economy expanded since the launching of the Opening Door Policy in 1978, global flows of trade and 
investment into China was marked by two major waves, the first taking place in the mid-1980s followed 
by the early 1990s and subsequently since 2001. 
 
2.1. Trade 
 
Between 1978 and 2000, the Chinese economy grew gently but began to switch gears to rapidly expand 
since 2001 following its membership of the World Trade Organization. Except for a decline in 2009 due 
to the global financial crisis, exports, imports and total trade of goods grew from US$266.1 billion, 
US$243.5 billion and US$509.6 billion, respectively in 2001 to US$1898.4 billion, US$1743.5 billion and 
US$3641.9 billion, respectively in 2011 (Figure 1), which expanded the share of trade in GDP from 5% in 
1979 to its peak of 70% in 2007 before falling to 59% in 2011 (Figure 2).  
 
  
 
 China’s share in world exports rose from 1.2% in 1983 to 11.4% in 2012 (Table 1). Figure 3 shows 
that growth in exports from China exceeded growth in world exports in the period 2001_2007. Although 
always less than exports the share of import in world merchandise also recorded significant expansion 
from 1.1% in 1983 to 10% in 2012. China ranked first in world exports of merchandise and second in 
trade (exports plus imports) totaling US$3867 billion in 2012 (Figure 4). The trade surplus of China 
reached US$230 billion in 2012 amounting to 2.8% of GDP. 
 Trade has played an important role in stimulating economic growth in China, but the biggest 
beneficiaries have been the sea-fronted Eastern provinces. Proximity to the sea has resulted in the 
proliferation of special economic zones (SEZs) in the coastal cities, such as Guangdong, which accounted 
for approximately one-third of China’s trade, though it fell from 36% in 2000 to 26% in 2010 (Figure 5). 
Efforts by the central government to reduce provincial inequality saw the rise of inland provinces so that 
Jiangsu and Beijing recorded sizeable amount of trade in 2010. However, regional inequality has 
persisted as the outlying provinces of Tibet, Xinjiang and Guizhou have remained poor. 
 
 
2.2. Foreign direct investment 
 
Aided by market reforms and accession to the WTO, China has become a major recipient of FDI in the 
world. China has also begun investing abroad, especially in the South countries. We examine China’s 
integration in the global economy through FDI flows in this section. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2.1. Inward foreign direct investment 
 
China has also strongly integrated in the global economy through inward foreign direct investment (FDI), 
which rose from US$20.7 billion in 2000 to US$193.3 billion in 2005 and US$578.8 billion in 2010 
(UNCTAD 2011, 193). Inward FDI as a share of GDP rose from 1% in 1991 to over 6% in 1993 before 
falling as a consequence of the Asian Financial Crisis. The jump in FDI in 1993 was a direct result of Deng 
Xiaoping’s South Tour in the summer of 1992, which was accompanied by the opening of four SEZs in 
the country. The campaign to realize China’s industrialization through joint ventures was launched to 
‘attract foreign technology in the industrial sector by leveraging on the domestic market.’ FDI has not 
only helped modernize China’s backward industrial sector by introducing cutting-edge technology, it has 
also quickened the shift in manufacturing operations from labour-intensive to technology-intensive 
operations. Except for the financial- crisis affected year of 2009, inward FDI registered over 3% of GDP 
over the period 2005_2013 (Figure 6). 
 
 The sectoral distribution shows that export-oriented labour-intensive manufacturing sector is 
the main destination of FDI, though its share fell from 71% in 2000 to 47% in 2010 (Table 2). However, 
despite falling shares, actual FDI into manufacturing experienced grew slightly from US$44 billion in 
2000 to US$49 billion in 2010. However, except for equipment manufacturing _ which enjoyed FDI 
shares rising from 4.3% in 2000 to 6.1% in 2010, the remaining sectors experienced falling FDI shares. 
Nevertheless, the growing real estate sector led by a price boom in 2003, began to attract strong inflows 
of FDI so that its share in overall FDI rose from 8.4% in 2000 to 22.7%. 
 Any assessment of the impact of globalization on China will not be complete without an account 
of FDI and its impact on International trade. Enjoying access to duty free imports when exporting, 
foreign firms share in exports rose from 0.2% in 1981 to its peak of 58.3% in 2005 before falling to 49.9% 
in 2012 (Table 3). Foreign firms’ share in imports rose from 0.5% in 1981 to its peak of 59.7% in 2006 
before falling to 47.9% in 2012. The export:import ratio improved in trend terms from 19.2 in 1981 to its 
peak of 124.3 in 2007. It has exceeded 100 over the period 1997_2012 demonstrating a positive trade 
balance over that period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2.2. Outward FDI 
 
Chinese FDI outflows have also become important especially after new century. Between 
2005 and 2010, Europe, the United States and Australia attracted US$43.2 billion, US$30.4 billion and 
US$38.4 billion FDI, respectively from China (Figure 7). Regionally, China’s outward FDI has also flowed 
considerably to South America (US$72.3 billion), Sub-Saharan Africa (US$56.4 billion), West Asia 
(US$51.7 billion), the Arab countries (US$43.7 billion) and East Asia (US$42.6 billion). 
 Sectorally, energy and power, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, West Asia and the 
Arab countries, have been the leading destination of China’s outward FDI, which accounted for US$61.8 
billion in 2011. In addition, large engineering and construction contracts, such as railway, roads, bridges 
and stadiums have also been important. The finance and real estate sectors attracted US$16.5 billion 
while agriculture received US$6.4 billion in 2011. Hence, despite the well-known fact that China’s 
outward foreign capital has mostly been confined to portfolio investments in American government 
bonds, its non-bonds investment flows show strong sectoral and geographic diversification as a 
consequence of its increasing integration into the world economy. 
 Motivated by the national strategy of ‘go-aboard’ with a set of supportive policy diplomatically 
and financially since 1998, outward FDI (the contract value from China) rose from US$11.7 billion in 
1998 to US$142 billion in 2011 (Figure 8). The huge current and capital account surpluses with foreign 
reserves reaching US$3.31 trillion in 2012 has made China a major capital exporter. Whereas 
traditionally, China invests extensively into energy and manufacturing in the developing economies, 
falling property prices following the global financial crisis has attracted massive Chinese investment into 
the developed economies of the US and Britain. Meanwhile, Chinese firms have also begun to acquire 
established foreign firms to quicken technological catch up. For example, Lenovo and Geely acquired 
International Business Machines (IBM) and Volvo in 2005 and 2010, respectively. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
3. Industrialization 
 
While global integration has been important, government focus on stimulating technological capability 
building was no less important in the rapid growth of manufacturing in China. Clearly, the focus on 
capital accumulation was directed at technological capability building. 
 Government promotion of manufacturing took on three different instruments. The first was a 
central government initiative that started in 1978 when four SEZs were created to attract export-
oriented industries, 14 cities were declared as coastal open cities in 1984 and regional development 
plans involving the three Delta schemes of Yangze River, Min Jiang and Pearl River Valleys. Where the 
industries promoted were identified as strategic, import controls (duties, quotas and licenses were used 
by the central government to promote high technology industries, such as automobiles and electronics). 
Government policies emphasized technology transfer to national firms when the domestic market was 
important. This was the basis on which Volkswagen was approved to produce and supply cars in the 
Chinese market.iii These controls were not used where production was largely for foreign markets. The 
Chinese government also offered special incentives by way of grants and tax breaks to promote high 
technology industries and technological upgrading. 
 At the same time, local governments were given the autonomy to implement central 
government initiatives (e.g. subsidized land lease rights and utilities, customs coordination), as well as, 
more importantly strategize to promote technological capability building in industries where the focus is 
on technological upgrading. Examples of successful local initiatives include efforts by the Shanghai 
government in the late 1980s to mandate that the Santana, a car produced by the Shanghai Volkswagen 
joint venture, be the only legitimate taxi to run in the city. Similarly, the Yongjia county and the Qiaotou 
municipality in Zhejiang province played a critical role in establishing cluster links between the firms and 
the designing and R&D centres with support from universities to stimulate technological upgrading in 
the button industry (Rasiah, Kong, and Vinanchiarachi 2011). Provincial governments also invested 
heavily into high-tech parks to stimulate technological upgrading in the high technology industries. 
 Led by government initiatives, FDI and international trade, the manufacturing sector in 
China has flourished since economic reforms began. As Zhang and Rasiah (2014) have shown market 
reforms helped raise efficiency and coordination, the state has remained in control of important 
decisions to stimulate technological upgrading and improvement of the material conditions of the 
people. China’s share in world manufactured exports grew from 1.9% in 1990 to 4.7% in 2000 and to 
16.8% in 2012. At the same time, manufacturing, which accounted for 94% of China’s exports in 2012, 
saw a tremendous growth of its share in export in the world from 1.9% in 1990 to 4.7% in 2000 before it 
reached 16.8% in 2012. 
 The share of manufacturing in total imports expanded sharply to 58% in 1987 after bottoming to 
26% in 1985 (Figure 9). However, manufacturing’s share in exports and imports grew strongly in the 
1990s to reach almost 80% each respectively in 1994. Whereas export shares have continued to rise to 
reach 94%, import shares fell to 56% in 2012. A combination of rising fuel imports and stronger domestic 
manufacturing production capabilities accounted for a fall in the share of manufactured imports in total 
imports (Rasiah, Miao, and Xin, 2013). 
 Manufacturing is the key component of the industrial sector with construction and utilities being 
the other components (Kaldor 1967). Although industrialization reached its highest share in GDP during 
the Great Leap Forward campaign in 1958, modern manufacturing did not seriously take off until the 
economic reforms. Its contribution to GDP has hovered around 30%_35% in the period 1984_2010 
(Figure 10). In addition, the contribution of industrial output in GDP has remained strong to reach 47% in 
2011. Although the contribution of manufacturing value added in GDP fell in 2008_2010 owing to a 
crash in exports caused by contracting imports from the developed economies, it grew in real prices 
from US$12 billion in 1965 to US$1243 billion in 2010 (Figure 11). Indeed, except for the steep growth 
recorded in 1967 (because of its small starting base), manufacturing value added grew strongest and in a 
sustained way in China since 1993. 
 China has enjoyed significant manufacturing structural change as the capital goods industry of 
machinery and transport equipment recorded the highest share, which rose from 18% in 1992 to 24% in 
2007 (Table 4). The contribution of textiles and clothing fell from 12.9% in 1992 to 10.0% in 2007. While 
growth in demand _ both domestic and foreign has been important, the role of the central, provincial 
and municipal governments have also been critical in stimulating innovation and technological 
upgrading in manufacturing.iv 
 In short, it is clear that China has undergone significant globalization and structural change with 
manufacturing showing a shift towards the higher value added activities of machinery and transport 
equipment. It will be interesting to see if these developments have translated into a high road to 
industrialization in the next section. 
  
 
 
 
4. Labour markets 
 
We discuss in this section the impact of internationalization and industrialization on China’s labour 
market. In doing so, we analyse first the labour supply demand patterns followed by an evaluation of 
the uneven rural-urban flows, and wages and labour unions in China. The analysis is to assess if 
globalization and industrialization has resulted in an improvement in the material conditions of workers 
in China. 
 
4.1. Supply - demand analysis 
 
Labour supply and demand of China have increasingly been governed by a blend of policy directives and 
market forces after economic reforms. On the supply side, major changes in labour supply have taken 
place with the demographic restructuring, such as the one-child policy has lowered the dependency 
ratio. On the demand side, China’s insertion into the global economy increased the demand for high-
quality labour as government policies focused on transforming economic specialization in the country 
from low to high value added activities. 
 
 
 
4.1.1. Labour supply 
 
Ostensibly, labour supply did not seem to be a problem for a large country like China with a population 
of over 1.3 billion in 2010. Industrialization drove large numbers of workers from agriculture to industry 
and services so that in the initial stages the massive supply of labour contributed to a low wage elasticity 
of economic growthv in manufacturing in the 1990s. Rapid urbanization and industrialization helped 
raise the wage elasticity of growth as the industrial reserve disappeared. These changes were influenced 
by both export growth as well as demographic changes in China. 
 Demographic changes have contributed to a strong long-term shift in labour supply as the one-
child policy sharply reduced population growth, which over the long run has eliminated the advantages 
of cheap labour. Labour-intensive industries have come under pressure as population growth slowed 
down sharply following a steep fall in birth rates from 1987 (Figure 12). Falling birth rates alongside a 
relatively stable death rate led to decline in population growth, which fell dramatically from 1.6% in 
1982 to 0.5% in 2011. 
 The impact of demographic changes has not only affected the quantity but also in the age 
structure of labour supply. The disaggregation of population composition shows that although the 
population aged between 15 and 64 increased from 0.7 billion in 1978 to 1.0 billion in 2011, the 
population aged 0_14 dropped from 0.3 billion in 1978 to 0.2 billion in 2011, which shows that China will 
be facing a problem of a small young population in the long run. Hence, while the rapid expansion in 
human capital has improved job opportunities (demand), the one-child family policy has been a major 
cause of sharply contracting labour supply market in China. 
 
4.1.2. Labour demand 
 
Whereas labour supply in China is determined by endogenous demographic factors, labour demand is 
sensitive to exogenous forces, such as globalization and industrialization. The transition of China from an 
agrarian to an industrial society has been driven by reforms since 1978, which has been the primary 
engine of global integration and economic structural change in the country. Since the focus here is on 
manufacturing, we estimate employment elasticity figures over the period where data is available, i.e. 
1998_2010.vi Employment elasticity refers to the growth in employment for every unit output 
generated. 
 Annual industrial employment elasticities over the period 1998_2012, which is estimated by 
dividing industrial employment growth by industrial output growth, is shown in Table 5. Real output 
grew every year over the period 1998_2012, while employment fell over the years 1999_2001 and 2009. 
Large scale retrenchments by state owned enterprises (SOEs) saw employment facing negative growth 
rates in 1999_2001, which resulted in negative employment elasticities. The massive layoffs that 
followed painful reforms targeted at SOEs in the late 1990s were absorbed by the emerging non-state 
sector.vii Except for 2009 (affected by the global financial crisis), positive industrial employment 
elasticities were recorded over the period 1999-2012. 
 
 The employment rate, the equilibrium point between labour supply and demand, jumped three 
times from 207 million to 761 million over the period 1952_2010 (Figure 13). Gripped by low wages and 
disguised unemployment during the communist rule, the social-market experiment following reforms 
boosted employment growth, which grew 553 million in 1989 to 647 million in 1990, recording its 
highest annual average growth rate of 17% in that period (Figure 14). The steady increase in labour force 
participation rate is a reflection of the nature of social market reforms China introduced to integrate 
with the global economy. 
 As a consequence of rapid labour absorption, the unemployment rateviii fell from 4.9% in 1980 
to its trough of 1.8% in 1985 before a two-decade-long rise to 4.3% in 2003 (Figure 15). Reforms 
instituted on SOEs led to a rise in unemployment to 3.1% in 1989. Despite labour absorption, 
unemployment rose steadily until 2003 owing to structural unemployment caused partly by reforms 
faced by the SOEs. It has since either fallen or kept steady in trend terms, reaching 4.1% in 2011.  
 Rapid industrialization transformed the sectoral labour force participation rates as the share of 
employment in agricultural sector fell from 83.5% in 1952 to 34.8% in 2011, while the commensurate 
shares in the industrial sector rose from 7.4% in 1952 to 29.5% in 2011 (Figure 16). Employment by 
services grew from a share of 9.1% in 1952 to 35.7% in 2011. Economic reforms and the integration into 
the global economy transformed China from an agricultural to an industrial economy. Labour migration 
into the booming industrial and service sectors was the major reason, the introduction of largescale 
agricultural production using high technology was also important. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 Manufacturing employment grew rapidly over the first reform period of 1978_1988 (Figure 17). 
A declining share of manufacturing in total employment from 15.9% in 1988 to 13.3% in 1990 is due to 
the fact that other sectors grew faster than manufacturing. Both employment, and the employment 
share of manufacturing in total employment grew in 1990_1996 as China enjoyed rapid growth similar 
to East Asia. Manufacturing employment fell again in 1997_2001 as a consequence of the Asian financial 
crisis of 1997_1998, and the relocation of labour-intensive manufacturing to Vietnam, Laos and 
Cambodia. 
 
4.2. Uneven distribution of labour 
 
 
Globalization and industrialization have also reproduced uneven regional distribution of labour in China. 
The huge size of China, and its diverse geographical and socio-economic background has given the 
labour market multifarious development patterns. Global integration benefited the coastal provinces 
more than the inland provinces owing to both a greater focus on the former than the latter in the initial 
reform period, as well as, the proximity offered by the seafront. Hence, the Eastern coastal provinces 
have enjoyed structural change towards medium and high technology industries and higher wages than 
the inland provinces. In the meanwhile, household registration system (hukou), as a population control 
scheme, separated labour supply and demand geographically, so that labour supply from rural and 
Western inland regions is institutionally constrained to fill up strong labour demand generated by the 
urban and East coastal regions. 
 Until around 2000, government policy to promote trade and FDI favoured the East coastal areas. 
After 2000, the significant improvement of trade conditions offered by accession to the WTO resulted in 
the government extending trade and investment focus to the whole of China. However, the importance 
of access to trade routes prevented the movement of labour-intensive industries to the Western inland 
provinces. Hence, the growth of export-driven industries drove massive movement of labor from the 
Western inland provinces to the coastal Eastern provinces, aggravating regional inequality in 
employment and wages. Compared to the middle and western provinces, the Eastern coastal provinces 
account for around half of national employment in the period 2003_2011 (Figure 18). In 2010, 50.3% of 
national employment was created by 11 out of 33 provinces/municipals in the Eastern China. The 
concentration in manufacturing was even higher at around 60% of national employment. 
 
4.3. Wages 
 
From a country that seemed like a base for unlimited cheap labour supply, China has transformed to 
experience rising real wages following a sustained rise in demand for labour and skills. Industrial exports 
aided strongly by important contributions from foreign capital, and foreign technology in particular has 
generated the demand for labour to record significant improvements in wages. The jump in real wage 
growth started in around 1998 when it was clear that the Multi-Fibre Arrangement _ which gave 
preferential market access in the developed countries to particular developing economies _ will be 
terminated by 2004 (Rasiah 2012). Although real wage growth fell below 7% in 2004, both overall and 
manufacturing enjoyed a massive annual growth in real wages between 7% and 20% over the remaining 
1998_2012 period (Table 6). Growth in manufacturing wages exceeded growth in overall wages in 1995, 
1998_2000 and 2003. The higher growth in non-manufacturing real wages since 2005 is largely a case of 
catching up with manufacturing. 
  
 Clearly, the rapid growth in real wages in the world’s most populous country demonstrates that 
the infusion of market forces in a protracted manner with the state retaining control to ensure that the 
interests of the poor are shielded is arguably a great example for other economies to study. The high 
increase in real wages obviously also suggests that China has managed to experience the high road to 
industrialization as defined by Piore and Sabel (1984), and Pyke and Sengenberger (1992). Rapid 
economic growth led by manufacturing has been accompanied by tangible improvements in the 
material conditions of labour as wages have grown significantly over the years. 
 As shown in Table 7, all manufacturing industries recorded rapid average annual real wage 
growth over the period 2001_2011. Overall (8.5%) wages grew faster than manufacturing (8.1%) wages 
for the reasons explained earlier. Tobacco and special purpose machinery recorded the highest wage 
growth in the manufacturing sector at 10.2% per annum. Between these two industries, tobacco by far 
enjoyed a massive real wage growth as mean wages 2000 prices in the industry reached 57,749 yuan 
compared to only 25,740 yuan in special purpose machinery. In addition, the manufacturing industries 
of textile, timber, bamboo and straw, furniture, paper and paper products, chemicals, nonmetallic 
mineral products, and general purpose machinery also enjoyed higher real wage growth than overall 
wage growth in China over the period 2001_2011. 
 In addition to rising wages caused by a greater rise in labour demand over labour supply and the 
rising premium for skilled and knowledge-based labour, the Chinese government has also reviewed its 
minimum wages every two years to ensure that the formal labour market is properly regulated. 
Minimum wages in China vary according to the regional and provincial differences in socio-economic 
conditions, as well as the concentration of labour across China. Although the national regulations, 
Regulations on Minimum Wage, was enforced in 2004 as a guideline to protect employees being fairly 
remunerated, the provincialization and decentralization processes following reforms allow local 
governments the regulatory space to initiate their own regulations based on specific socio-economic 
conditions. Moreover, the changing external economic environment caused by factors, such as, 
inflation,ix have often required the authorities to calibrate minimum wages to reflect market conditions 
so as to protect the welfare of employees. Following the law to encourage provincial authority to adjust 
the minimum wage once every two years until it is lifted up to 40% of average wage of urban employees 
in 2015, the national average annual growth rate of minimum wage was increased by 22% in 2011 and 
20.5% in 2010. Among the provinces, Shanghai enjoyed the highest monthly and hourly minimum wages 
of 1620 yuan and 14 yuan, respectively, while the landlocked provinces/regions such as Guizhou and 
Chongqing recorded lower monthly and hourly minimum wages (Table 8). The dynamic economic 
provinces of Guangdong, Shenzhen, Jiangsu and Zhejiang also enjoyed relatively high minimum wages. 
 
4.4. Female labour 
 
We examine the gender issue in China’s labour market here because female labour is attracting strong 
attention as they emerge from a background of subordination to males. Because China’s early history 
has been dominated by men, the gender inequality that persisted since the Han Dynasty had remained 
until the establishment of People’s Republic in 1949 when the Communist Party announced that the 
liberalization of women as a sign of modernization. Encouraged by Mao Zedong’s motto of ‘woman can 
also hold up half sky,’ women were given equal rights to participate in the social relations of production. 

 
 
 Women’s participation in the formal labour market became more pronounced since market 
reforms were introduced in 1978. Attracted by the better urban incomes, young migrant women left 
their homes from rural areas to seek employment in industrial areas to supplement household incomes 
or to support their male siblings to attend college. Statistics from Shenzhen General Labour Union 
(2003) show that 70% of the 5.5 million migrant workers were females in the Shenzhen Special 
Economic Zone in 2003. In one of its sub-districts, i.e. Nanshan, female labour accounted for 80% of the 
entire workforce with an average age of 23. However, lacking the skills and knowledge of urban 
educated woman, most rural female migrants are employed in segmented labour markets in the 
informal and low-wage employment sectors. Young migrant workers, with minimal education and 
awareness of labour-related rights found are largely exposed to low-wage employment with weak 
labour protection and physical and psychological problems. 
 
 The development of female employment since the Communist Party took over is associated 
with the following: first, the modernization of household relations as women began to enter education 
stream in large numbers, (including in technical fields), and second, market reforms since 1978 provided 
massive demand for female labour. However, while these two developments unleashed strong 
motivation for women to work, the gradual withdrawal of the state from economic activities triggered a 
gradual fall in female labour force participation rates, which dropped from 72.7% in 1990 to 63.8% in 
2012 (Figure 19). The steep decline happened since 1998 until middle 2000s, which is believed to be a 
consequence of large-scale SOE reforms as a massive number of employees were retrenched. Rising 
incomes also led a number of females to stay home and take care of household chores. Hence, females 
in the labour force stabilized at 36%_38% in the period 1994_2011. 
 Overall and female employment in manufacturing has started to decline since 1994 before both 
of them experienced a rise after bottoming in 2003. The female composition declined from its highest of 
45% in 1995 to its lowest of 39% in 2011(Figure 20). The declining trend in the female share of 
employment in manufacturing is a consequence of industrial upgrading from low technology labour-
intensive industries, such as, clothing and tools manufacturing, to middle technology industries, such as, 
machinery manufacturing. While the former is dominated by female workers, the latter is dominated by 
male workers. Nevertheless, manufacturing alone accounted for 30.9%_42.4% of overall female 
employment over the period 1994_2011 (Figure 21). 
 
 Although China has enjoyed a relatively high female labour participation rate compared to most 
developing economic and the smallest rural-urban and gender wage gaps among developing countries 
(World Bank Institute 2012), female labour in manufacturing shows longer working hours than workers 
(including female) in the overall economy over the period 2001_2011. This gap has narrowed since over 
the period 2007_2011. In general, both male and female working hours in manufacturing is much longer 
compared to other sectors (Table 9). However, there is no discernible difference in male-female working 
hours over the period 2001_2011 to suggest that women work longer than men in manufacturing. The 
narrowing gap in working hours between manufacturing and other sectors also shows a shift in 
economic activity away from manufacturing to the other sectors, such as, services. 
 
 
 
 However, severe challenges still face China’s female workers. Although industrialization and 
globalization have improved wages, female workers earned less than 31% on average the wages of man 
in 2011 for doing the same job. Also, gender discrimination also affected female job seekers in the 
employment market with many employers preferring male employees owing to legal protection for 
maternity leave and other preferential treatment given to women. In addition, urban migrant female 
workers often face serious social problems. Given the special characteristic of unions in China, which are 
a subordinate organ of government, female labour often lacks empowerment to seek their labour-
related rights. The government’s sanctioning of other forms of unionization denied the All-China 
Federation of Trade Unions the legitimacy to fight for worker’s rights. As a consequence, the collective 
bargaining power of migrant women workers is largely absent to assist them to seek their rights from 
employers. Hence, unrests involving worker abuse have continued to explode in China, such as, the 
notorious Foxconn suicide scandal. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Although we have not examined the state of freedom and happiness the people of China may have 
enjoyed when the gates to global integration were opened in 1978, the evidence shows that massive 
trade and investment flows have followed since reforms began, which has not only stimulated rapid 
economic growth and structural change but it has also generated significant improvement in real wages, 
especially from the 1990s. The advantages offered by the seafront and an earlier focus by the 
government made the Eastern coastal provinces the largest beneficiaries of globalization in China. 
Manufacturing value added and structural change and wages have grown the fastest in these states. 
Nevertheless, the middle inland provinces and federal territories of Jiangsu and Beijing have also 
benefited considerably from the transformation. Although regional inequalities have widened as a 
consequence of the faster development of the Eastern provinces compared to the Western provinces 
the evidence shows that material progress has been felt by most provinces. 
 The evidence shows that global integration through the infusion of capitalist organization under 
a socialist structure where the central government has increasingly decentralized planning to absorb 
provincial and municipal participation in decision making has been successful in ensuring long run 
growth, structural change and improvements in wages. The government’s focus on targeting 
technological capability has been important in the structural transformation of manufacturing from 
lower to higher value added activities. Elsewhere Mathews (2014) has offered convincing evidence to 
show how China is driving Asia’s new great transformation through a focus on renewable energy to 
power economic growth. 
 However, China’s massive industrial labour market has also been gripped by social problems. 
Manufacturing workers on average still work longer than other workers in the economy. While female 
labour force participation rates are high compared to other developing countries, rising wages has also 
capped further increases since the 2000s as women have chosen to handle household chores more. 
However, not everything has been rosy as vulnerable industrial rural migrant workers have also been 
exposed to abuse by factories from time to time. Also, women on average still earn around one-third of 
men for similar work done in China. 
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